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ABSTRACT 
Felipe Pérez Martí, who was the Venezuelan Minister of Planning and Development in 
the government of Hugo Chávez, proposes an economic model that he calls the 
altruistic economy or fourth way, which leads cooperative game theory to its logical 
extremes postulating a pure communism. Here we sustain that, first, it is impossible in 
the model of Pérez Martí to marginally allocate non-primary goods to those most in 
need or who most value them, facing a problem of defective economic calculation, and 
second, in order to achieve equality, he would have to replace his atomic local planners 
by a central planner, who would be unable to overcome the problem of imperfect and 
incomplete information. 
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Introduction 
 
In the heat of the so-called ‘twenty-first century socialism’, Latin America has become a laboratory 
for the creation and testing of new ideas about the design and operation of a post-capitalist society. 
From this cauldron of ideas comes the work of Felipe Pérez Martí, who was the Venezuelan 
Minister of Planning and Development in the government of Hugo Chávez in 2002 and 2003. The 
research of Pérez Martí forms a part of cooperative game theory, and it proposes an economic 
model that he calls the altruistic economy or fourth way. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a critique of the theoretical model of Pérez Martí, 
which falls within the research programme inspired by the 1994 Nobel Laureate in Economics John 
Nash. Instead of extensively reviewing other sources on altruistic economics, we will expound the 
development of the programme of Nash and how it–in principle–departs from Pareto equilibrium. 
How our critique applies to other models of the altruistic economy is a question that we shall not 
tackle in this paper, and hence will remain open for now. 
We will go on to show how the model of Pérez Martí leads cooperative game theory to its 
logical extremes, postulating a pure communism, where the community gains from each person to 
the extent of her ability, and where each person receives as her needs require; this according to 
Pérez Martí is a feasible formula which corresponds to the famous aphorism of Marx (1891, 24): 
‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!’ 
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 Our critique will consist in explaining, first, why it is impossible in the model of Pérez Martí 
to marginally allocate non-primary goods to those most in need or who most value them, facing a 
problem of defective economic calculation, and second, why in order to achieve equality, Pérez 
Martí would have to replace his atomic local planners by a central planner, who would be unable to 
overcome the problem of imperfect and incomplete information. To achieve our aims, we will rely 
on the method of praxeology, which consists of a verbal deduction from the axiom that human 
beings act in accordance with ends of their choice. 
 
 
From Pareto Equilibrium to Nash Equilibrium 
 
A contemporary and realistic definition of Pareto equilibrium would include the following: it is an 
ideal state of distribution of the subjective satisfactions of consumers and producers, from which it 
is impossible to move away without affecting the satisfaction of at least one individual, and at 
which it is possible to arrive assuming that production and trade are conducted in classical 
environments, which according to Hurwicz (1973 and 1987) are characterised by: the absence of 
externalities, no local saturation of preferences, absolute divisibility of factors of production, 
convexity or absence of increasing returns to scale, and temporal homogeneity. Under these 
assumptions, it is easy to admit that the mechanism best able to position the equilibrium point over 
the production possibility frontier is the market-fiction described by the theory of Vilfredo Pareto. 
Pareto himself was aware of the fictitious nature of this equilibrium, which represents the height of 
the satisfaction of a community, and he defined it as follows: 
 
We will say that the members of a collectivity enjoy maximum ophelimity in a certain 
position when it is impossible to find a way of moving from that position very slightly in 
such a manner that the ophelimity enjoyed by each of the individuals of that collectivity 
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 increases or decreases. That is to say, any small displacement in departing from that 
position necessarily has the effect of increasing the ophelimity which certain individuals 
enjoy, and decreasing that which others enjoy, of being agreeable to some and disagreeable 
to others. (Pareto 1909, 261) 
 
In equilibrium, producers and consumers get the maximum of ophelimity, because the value of the 
marginal physical product of all exploitations equalises its price, and in this situation, the scale of 
production of all exploitations would be the maximum possible. The deliberate reduction in the 
scale of production to increase the relative scarcity of useful effects, along with the charging of a 
price–which will be pocketed by private producers–more than the value of the marginal physical 
product, is not a feature of the market-fiction of neoclassicals, but of the real market that we all 
experience to some extent. 
That the market-fiction of neoclassicals does not find a feasible alternative other than that of 
market socialism is a different kettle of fish. Here we only are interested in stressing that the welfare 
of the community would be divided between producer surplus and consumer surplus, which 
represent the satisfaction measured in units of utility which can not be compared interpersonally, 
reaching a maximum in equilibrium thanks to the individual pursuit of profit through voluntary 
trade, and under the conditions listed above. 
The road to Nash equilibrium took its departure from a critique of Pareto equilibrium, and 
began to be forged in the autumn of 1940 when John von Neumann proposed to Oskar Morgenstern 
to work together on a paper. Four years later, this became their groundbreaking joint work Theory 
of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) (See Morgenstern 1976), although its background could 
be traced back to the nineteenth century work of Augustin Cournot (See Myerson 1999). 
Morgenstern was an economist trained in the tradition of the Austrian School. He was thus 
aware of the dynamic properties of the real market, which make it impossible to equalise prices to 
marginal costs in a capitalist economy without collapsing the market, as the expectations of 
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 producers would be frustrated by failing to make a profit. One of his appraisals on the market-
fiction of neoclassicals runs as follows: 
 
In the current equilibrium theory, there is nothing of this true kind of competition: there are 
only individuals, firms or consumers, facing given prices, fixed conditions, each firm or 
consumer for convenience insignificantly small and having no influence whatsoever upon 
the existing conditions of the market (rather mysteriously formed by tâtonnement […] and 
therefore solely concerned with maximizing sure utility or profit–the latter then being 
exactly zero. The contrast with reality is striking; the time has come for economic theory to 
turn around and to “face the music.” (Morgenstern 1972, 1164) 
 
Game theory was intended to address the consequences of the naive utopia built by neoclassicals, 
but the project was methodologically defective. Instead of relying on the method that has 
accompanied the development of Austrian economics up to the present day, praxeology, game 
theory was built upon the positivistic foundations offered by mathematics. 
The limitations of game theory to understand institutional real-world phenomena were 
evident in Morgenstern (1972, 1171), when he noted that the neoclassical assumption of the agents’ 
perfect foresight would be replaced in his theory by that of perfect and complete information; in his 
own words, this is because ‘these concepts are used in a specific manner in game theory and 
without contradiction.’ This led to the development of the theory of expected utility and thus, 
investment and consumption decisions could allegedly be satisfactorily addressed from the likely 
outcomes an individual faces when making decisions in an atmosphere of rivalry. 
Previously, Morgenstern (1948, 16) had referred to the most common objection to this issue: 
‘You may also ask how one could be sure of the existence of a solution for all conceivable games.’ 
But instead of answering with a reference to the entrepreneurial uncertainty that permeates 
investment and consumption decisions in the real world, he confined himself to extolling the rigor 
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 in the treatment of actuarial risk, which is the only one that can be addressed by game theory1. ‘But 
aside from the intuitive appeal these ideas may or may not have,’ he said, ‘they find rigorous 
mathematical formulation and were subjected to the most painstaking scrutiny of which modern 
logic is capable’ (Morgenstern 1948, 16). 
Against this background, it was not surprising that such a gifted mathematician as John F. 
Nash, instead of a social scientist, ended up establishing himself as one of the most important game 
theorists. But the definitive break with Morgenstern’s critique of neoclassical economics was 
reached with Nash’s reintroduction of Pareto equilibrium in game theory. As stated by Harold W. 
Kuhn (in Nobel Seminar 1994, 179-180), by bringing Pareto efficiency among his axioms, Nash 
radically broke with the tradition that the bargaining problem is indeterminate. 
But Morgenstern was concerned about the determination of an optimum game strategy, 
which he understood as radically different from determining the general equilibrium that requires 
too demanding conditions. Thus, Morgenstern (1972, 1174) wondered how neoclassical economists 
were so audacious as to postulate a stable economic system, if the stability of a much simpler 
system as the moon’s orbit around the earth still could not be proved. He described the difference 
between his vision of game theory and the general equilibrium as follows: 
 
Now it is one of the decisive steps in the theory of games to show that one is not 
confronted with maximum problems (unless dealing with an absolutely isolated Robinson 
Crusoe, and its formal equivalent) but with a fundamentally different situation. […] Where 
is the difference? It lies in the fact that the theory of competition assumes that the 
individual or firms are in full control of all the variables that determine the outcome of any 
transaction undertaken. (Morgenstern 1948, 11) 
 
But what does Nash equilibrium entail? To illustrate this, there is no better source than A Beautiful 
Mind, the Academy Award-winning film by Ron Howard, based on the unauthorised biography of 
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 Nash by Sylvia Nasar. The scene takes place in a bar near Princeton University, where Nash 
pursued his doctoral studies. Amid the bustle and cigarette smoke, Nash is seemingly able to pursue 
his abstract formulations in front of a table filled with his books and annotations. Some friends of 
his arrive, followed seconds later by some girls who capture their attention. One of them, a blonde, 
stands out in particular, and sparks a discussion among the men on the best strategy to approach her. 
The part of the dialogue we are interested in to illustrate Nash’s eureka is as follows: 
 
Hansen: Have you remembered nothing? Recall the lessons of Adam Smith, the father of 
modern economics. 
Saul: In, uh, in competition… 
Group: …individual ambition serves the common good.  
Hansen: Exactly. 
Nielssen: Every man for himself, gentlemen. 
Bender: And those who strike out are stuck with their friends. 
Hansen: I’m not gonna strike out. 
Saul: You can lead a blonde to water, but you can’t make her drink. 
Hansen: Uh, I don’t think he [Adam Smith] said that. 
Saul: All right, nobody move. She’s looking over here. All right, she’s looking at Nash. 
Hansen: Oh, God. All right, he may have the upper hand now, but wait until he opens his 
mouth. Remember the last time?  
Bender: Ah yes, that was one for the history books. 
Nash: Adam Smith needs revision. 
Hansen: What are you talking about? 
Nash: If we all go for the blonde, we block each other, and not a single one of us is going 
to get her. So then we go for her friends, but they will all give us the cold shoulder because 
nobody likes to be second choice. But what if no one goes for the blonde? We don’t get in 
each other’s way, and we don’t insult the other girls. That’s the only way we win. That’s 
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 the only way we all get laid… Adam Smith said, the best result comes from everyone in 
the group doing what’s best for himself, right? That’s what he said, right? Incomplete! 
Incomplete! Because the best result would come from everyone in the group doing what’s 
best for himself and the group. 
 
If Pareto equilibrium is defined as the situation where no bargainer can increase his well-being with 
an additional exchange without harming the well-being of another bargainer, who will therefore 
refuse to make such an exchange, Nash equilibrium requires the contrary: a cooperation among a 
sub-group of bargainers, who agree not to compete because they have rationally found that 
decisions taken unilaterally, and without the consent of the other bargainers, could affect the well-
being of the deserter, who had irrationally chosen not to cooperate. In Nash’s own words: 
 
A TWO-PERSON bargaining situation involves two individuals who have the opportunity 
to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than one way. In the simpler case […] no action 
taken by one of the individuals without the consent of the other can affect the well-being of 
the other one. (Nash 1950, 155) 
 
Following McCloskey (1985, 437) in the way to illustrate the prisoner’s dilemma that cartels face, 
we can represent the scene from the film as follows. If Nash and Hansen (to simplify the example) 
both decide to compete for the blonde, they hamper each other and both earn her rejection. If they 
turn their attention to the other girls, they are also rejected, as the girls do not want to be ‘second 
choice’. 
This is the state of competition shown in Figure 1, Part I by the intersection point 1, and in 
Figure 1, Part II by the lower right-hand box. There, Nash and Hansen would have to settle for a 
gratification equal to Bii + Cii, which represents neither of them getting any girls. For those readers 
trained in the currents of institutional economics, this outcome will probably be counterintuitive, 
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 because competition would allegedly produce the highest possible welfare surplus. But we have to 
remember that in the market-fiction of neoclassicals, the prices of goods equalise their marginal 
costs, reducing profits to zero, as shown in one of the most reputable microeconomics textbooks, 
e.g., Varian (1987, 403). 
 
 
Figure 1: Part I depicts curves of supply and demand 
and the different points of equilibria depending on 
whether Pareto optimum or cartel formation. Part II 
depicts a matrix of payoffs from cooperation and 
defection. Nash’s payoffs is the upper left of each box, 
Hansen’s the lower right. 
 
 
 
 
 
In fact, the ideal of the maximum expansion of producer and consumer surpluses only finds a 
feasible alternative in a model of market socialism, which drops the utilitarian grounds and the 
positivistic premises of the modern neoclassical economics. Here, using the separation between 
ownership and control which is opened up in advanced capitalism, the state on behalf of the 
community could administer a system of incentives that leads public enterprises to compete with 
each other to offer the best choices of consumption and investment for the citizens, pricing goods in 
the short term according to their marginal costs (See Agafonow 2008). 
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 Then, the profits that are privately appropriated under capitalism would be returned to the 
citizens under this market socialism in the form of an expansion of the scale of production, 
consistent with the relative scarcity and the free preferences of consumers. In the real-world market, 
this expansion of production does not occur, because a part of the resources that are manifest in the 
form of surpluses are privately appropriated, producing a general increase in the relative scarcity 
and in the prices of goods. 
If Nash and Hansen, despite feeling very attracted to the blonde, both agree to ignore her, 
they will not block each other, and moreover the other girls will not ‘strike them out,’ feeling 
offended and thinking that they are second choice. As Nash says in the film, ‘That’s the only way 
we all get laid.’ This is the Nash equilibrium characterised by cooperation, shown in Figure 1, Part I 
by the intersection point 2, and in Figure 1, Part II by the upper left-hand box. There, Nash and 
Hansen get the best gratification equal to Bi + Bii, which represents them both getting girls. 
But the fact that it is the best situation for them does not mean that it is the best situation for 
the whole group, since in the case of our example, assuming that this is a conservative group, 
getting a girl means running the risk of: 1) a bad reputation, 2) venereal disease, or 3) an unwanted 
pregnancy. This is precisely the case of a local equilibrium, as rightly pointed out by Guerrien 
(1998, 149), and it is characteristic of monopolies and oligopolies, as recognised by Morgenstern 
(1972, 1171) when he stated that if the cooperation takes place, tâtonnement would not reach the 
Pareto equilibrium. 
 
 
Rationality in the Model of Pérez Martí 
 
Characteristic of Nash equilibrium is that altruism, which is manifest in the cooperation, is a 
product of the rationality of the bargainers. Undoubtedly, Nash and Hansen would succeed 
cooperating since they would both get a girl, in contrast with competition, where the marginal value 
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 of the product of their efforts equalises its price, reducing their profits to zero, which is just like 
neither of them getting any girl, having blocked each other in pursuit of the blonde and offended the 
other girls. According to this theory, the stability over time of this cooperation lies in the capability 
of rational individuals to identify the alternatives that will bring more benefits, which always will 
coincide with the cooperation. In the words of Pérez Martí: 
 
[…] if selfish people could change their preferences at will, when markets fail because of 
lack of insurance mechanisms and the existence of public goods, selfish people would 
consider it worthwhile to do so and would be more kind to each other. Also, once they 
changed their personalities, they would not return to being selfish, since from the 
perspective of the new situation, the outcomes of selfish relations would make them worse 
off. (Pérez Martí 2000a, 55. See also Pérez Martí and Marhuenda 1999, 02, 11-12) 
 
As has happened in the economic literature developed from the work of John Nash, Pérez Martí 
aims to harmonise the general equilibrium with the local equilibria promoted by cooperation, away 
from the healthy scepticism of Morgenstern (1972, 1174 and 1948, 11) with respect to general 
equilibrium. Also, as Oskar Lange led neoclassical economics to its logical extremes in the 1930s, 
postulating a market socialism where the Walrasian auctioneer is embodied by a central planner 
which responds to prices freely determined in a consumer market, Pérez Martí leads cooperative 
game theory to its logical extremes, postulating a pure communism where the collectivity would 
gain from each person as much as her abilities can offer, and assign to each person as her needs 
require, constrained by the possibilities of production: 
 
In this case altruism is conceived, not as a complement to the market or the state, but as a 
pure, self-sufficient and self-sustaining mechanism. A theorem of this kind would be the 
formal basis of a pure communism, which advocates social relations in which there is no 
 11
 market or state. In a society like this, people would voluntarily produce what they better 
know to produce, without expecting something in return (‘From each according to his 
ability’). In addition, the output would marginally go to those most in need or who most 
value it (‘to each according to his needs’). The requirement for the complete efficiency 
would be a certain degree of altruism in each individual, an analytic resort of the 
‘subjective conditions’ of the Marxist literature or of the ‘new man’ of Christian theology. 
(Pérez Martí 2000b, 68) 
 
Pérez Martí introduces an original difference in terms of the rationality of the agents. If, in the 
research programme of Nash, individuals are able to know–because they are rational–that 
cooperation and not competition will yield greater benefits, Pérez Martí interprets this as equivalent 
to the problem of the planner or Walrasian auctioneer, who in the Arrow-Debreu model has perfect 
information. In Lange’s own model (1936 and 1937), this assumption is less demanding but 
certainly colossal, since it implies that this planner has to gather a complete inventory of the 
quantities and qualities of all factors of production to ensure, outside the jurisdiction of catallactic 
competition, the combination of factors which minimises the average cost across the whole 
economy. 
Pérez Martí confronts this problem, accepting that individuals are indeed irrational, but able 
to love their fellow men. If this loving condition is limited to the neighbourhood of each individual, 
everyone would only have to worry about his or her own neighbours, and the problem of the 
information necessary to make efficient exchanges disappears: 
 
One of the problems of altruism as a mechanism of allocation is the excessive rationality 
required from each individual, if everyone is going to consider in their decisions the rest of 
the society. It would have then the same problem of the central planner, but multiplied by 
the entire population. Faced with this problem, it can be assumed that each individual is 
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 concerned only about her neighbours […] The result of the complete efficiency would 
have one condition: ‘heroes’ are needed in the society, people who love their neighbours 
more that themselves. The less rational individuals are, in general, the more appreciation of 
their neighbours (and somehow, faith) will be required to reach such a level of efficient 
allocation of resources. (Pérez Martí 2000b, 68-69) 
 
Thus, Pérez Martí and Marhuenda (1998, 02-03) move away from the egotistic cooperation that 
characterises Nash equilibrium and qualify the status of rationality of the bargainers, postulating a 
true altruism. Here, the stability over time of this cooperation does not lie in the ability of rational 
individuals to identify alternatives which will bring more benefits to themselves, as with Nash 
equilibrium, but in true altruists’ consideration of the well-being of their neighbours as a condition 
for increasing their own well-being. 
 
 
Public Goods in the Model of Pérez Martí 
 
Samuelson (1954 and 1955) was the first mathematical economist to offer a theory of collective 
consumption goods in the way it is nowadays presented in textbooks of microeconomics, moving 
away from the idea of public goods that the development of mixed economies and the welfare states 
had given rise to in practice–It is this latter idea that fortunately remains dominant today in both law 
and the collective psyche. Margolis (1955, 348) rightly stated that this new concept was based on 
the hope of mathematical economists, as pure theoreticians, to create a science free of value 
judgments. As Samuelson (1955, 352-353) himself recognised, mathematical economists can only 
judge the best results once supplied with a social welfare function that is politically or ethically 
determined. Thus, this new concept of public goods was limited to goods whose consumption by an 
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 individual does not reduce the consumption of any others, with national defence as the paradigmatic 
case. 
Because the science of economics is built mostly upon a utilitarian philosophy, utility has 
been the psychophysical unit of welfare privileged in this discipline. Therefore, if we want to 
provide an optimal amount of public goods, most economists would argue that it should also meet 
the optimum condition of Pareto equilibrium, i.e. that the marginal satisfaction provided by the 
public good to each person equalises the marginal subjective cost which each person had to incur to 
finance this good. 
This condition is not difficult to meet for private goods, since their consumption by an 
individual implies the exclusion of all others, i.e. if I eat a mango, ride a bicycle, or wear a pair of 
shoes, no one else can join this consumption without reducing the amount of good which I intend to 
consume. The nature of these goods allows the market to ration their consumption from a revelation 
of our preferences adjusted by our disposable income. I approach a store, see the price of some 
shoes that I like, and if in my opinion it is worth paying that much for the satisfaction I think this 
good will provide, compared to the alternatives that other shops offer, a seller will charge me the 
stipulated price. 
But how to do this with goods whose nature prevents such individualised rationing? How do 
we offer some amount of national defence, scenic beauty or clean air to every person, with the 
certainty that they will pay according to the subjective well-being that each one gets from the public 
good in question? If individuals are selfish, they will seek to hide and distort their true preferences 
to obtain a subjective satisfaction above the subjective marginal cost of paying for these goods, so 
that others bear the burden of overfinancing public goods. Since Pérez Martí is a mathematical 
economist, he accepts the definition of Samuelson, but takes a step forward into political economy 
to propose what is in his opinion a better alternative for the provision of public goods: 
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 The situation could change with altruistic agents. The incentive to live at the expense of 
others disappears, at least in part, because people are concerned about the negative 
consequences of their actions on others. Additionally, it can be assumed that the altruistic 
mechanism offers adequate information about the people involved, since they at least know 
their ‘neighbours’, either by physical proximity, ease of communication or kinship. Due to 
their refusal to comply with the results of the market mechanism, people could 
spontaneously organise themselves to provide the public good, and thus improve welfare in 
this way. (Pérez Martí 2000b, 66. See also Pérez Martí and Marhuenda 1999, 02) 
 
This alternative would solve the problem depicted in Figure 1, Part I by the intersection point 3, and 
in Figure 1, Part II by the lower left-hand box. There, Nash decides to cheat and leaves the 
agreement reached with Hansen not to compete for the blonde. If Hansen is not aware that Nash is 
deceiving him and courting the blonde behind his back, Nash gets a gratification equal to Bi + Ci + 
Cii + D, i.e. he manages to win the heart of the blonde (Otherwise, Hansen wins the heart of the 
blonde and Nash ends up with a gratification equal to Bii, which is depicted by the intersection point 
4, and the upper right-hand box). Whereas if Hansen is aware of the breakdown of the agreement, 
they both return to the state of competition represented by the intersection point 1. 
 
 
The Limitations of the Model of Pérez Martí 
 
Pérez Martí conceives altruism in two ways. First, he views it as a complement to the market and 
the state, which finds many manifestations in current mixed economies. He has used this theoretical 
framework to analyse the case of the free software GNU/Linux (See Pérez Martí n.d. and Pérez 
Martí and Marhuenda 1999). Second, he conceives it as a pure, self-sufficient and self-sustaining 
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 mechanism. Our concern is related to two problematic aspects of the pure altruistic model of Pérez 
Martí, which we call the problem of economic calculation and the problem of equality. 
 
 
Economic Calculation in the Model of Pérez Martí 
 
Enrico Barone and Vilfredo Pareto warned in the early twentieth century that a central planner 
would be unable to solve the system of equations of a large economy. Pareto (1909, 178) was more 
specific when he argued that in the simplified case of 100 individuals and 700 kinds of 
merchandise, a system of 70,699 equations would have to be solved, a task which exceeds the 
human mind’s capacity of algebraic analysis. This approach was substantially refined by Robbins 
(1938) and Hayek (1940 and 1945) from an Austro-liberal point of view, and by Dickinson (1939) 
from a liberal-socialist point of view. They went more deeply into specific aspects of the colossal 
challenge of monitoring and responding appropriately to the changes of circumstances in every 
instance of time, place and industry, highlighting the virtues of the coordinative properties of public 
information carried by market prices2. 
Pérez Martí (2000a, 54, 57) is fully aware of this problem and, as we explained above, he 
argues that the problem of the necessary information to make efficient exchanges disappears if 
individuals are able to love each other, because each one only has to worry about his or her own 
neighbours. So Pérez Martí cleverly replaces the central planner, with his inability to calculate, with 
atomic local planners, embodied by ordinary individuals who empathise with the small number of 
individuals in their own setting in order to obtain accurate information about their preferences: 
 
The model of preferences proposed could be interpreted as an analysis of relations among 
‘atomic local planners’ who, to formulate their wishes, take into account not only their own 
preferences and resources but also those of others. They are atomic in the sense that their 
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 wishes do not necessarily turn into reality because of their low power. They are local 
because they care about their neighbours, and not necessarily the whole society as in the 
case of the central planner. (2000b, 67. See also Pérez Martí and Marhuenda 1999, 03, 05) 
 
However, the efficient allocation of resources requires an additional condition which Pérez Martí 
has neglected. If these atomic local planners produced and exchanged based on feelings of love 
rather than commercial interest, it would be impossible for the product to be ‘marginally allocated 
to those most in need or who most value it’, as Pérez Martí (2000b, 68) hopes will happen. The 
degree of precision of a capitalist or socialist market, reaching marginal levels of satisfaction, is 
only possible if the exchange of non-primary goods takes place in response to the demand of the 
highest bidders, and not to the love of the supplier. 
Let’s suppose that at a price fixed at the time t0, the liquidation of inventories increases so 
much that queues or waiting lists are created for purchasing a good. This indicates that the marginal 
sacrifice for the transfer of a part of the income of consumers who are willing to stand in a queue, is 
lower than the marginal utility which the consumption of this good provides. The allocative virtue 
of the market lies in the fact that those persons who choose to queue up or join a waiting list will be 
the most in need or who most value the good in question, because they think the marginal sacrifice 
of income will be offset by the utility that the good will provide to them. 
On the contrary, if at a higher price fixed at the time t1, the liquidation of inventories 
decreases together with queues or waiting lists, this indicates that the marginal sacrifice for the 
transfer of a part of the income of consumers who leave the queues, is greater than the marginal 
utility which the consumption of this good provides. In this case, the allocative virtue of the market 
lies in the fact that, when increasing the sale price of this good, those persons who decide to leave 
the queue or the waiting list will be those who are less in need or who less value the good, because 
they think the marginal sacrifice of income would not be offset by the utility provided to them by 
the consumption of the good. 
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 But if the exchange of non-primary goods takes place as a response to the love of the 
supplier, she will prefer to deliver the good to a consumer who is not willing to stand in a queue or 
put her name down in a waiting list at the time t0, or she will prefer to deliver the good to a 
consumer who left the queue at the time t1. The requirements for delivering this good would no 
longer be the revealed preference in the act of standing in a queue or paying a higher price, but the 
bonds of neighbourhood that feed the relationship between supplier and demander. That is, 
suppliers would be willing to waive a portion of the profit that the sale of their product would 
normally bring, while demanders could not see their most urgent preferences satisfied unless they 
traded with a member of their small community of neighbours. 
The consequences of the pure communism of Pérez Martí would be devastating to economic 
growth and the expansion of the production possibility frontier. Altruism is essential as a 
complement to the market and the state, but when it is conceived as a ‘pure, self-sufficient and self-
sustaining mechanism’ as in Pérez Martí (2000b, 68), it is impossible for non-primary goods to be 
marginally allocated to those most in need or who most value them. 
 
 
Equality in the Model of Pérez Martí 
 
On the other hand, the satisfaction of the principle of equality in the pure communism of Pérez 
Martí (2000b, 68) depends on the closure of the network formed by individuals to connect all 
members of the society, resulting in a domino effect. Equality promoted in this way depends on the 
proportionality of resources controlled by what we might call local monopolies, consisting of 
groups of neighbours who, thanks to love, profess mutual loyalty to each other. 
This network can be represented as Figure 2, where we have three groups of neighbours 
identified by the letters A, B and C. Each circle represents an individual, and the size of the circles 
indicates the amount of resources controlled by individuals, while letters indicate their affiliation 
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 with each group. The relations among individuals within each group, and the relations among 
groups are represented by lines connecting the circles to each other. 
 
 
 Figure 2: Social network which represents three 
groups of neighbours identified by the letters A, B 
and C.  
 
These relations are contingent, depending on the capacity of each individual to empathise with 
others, regardless of whether they are all altruistic. Moreover, relations among groups will depend 
on the geographical and cultural barriers that separate them. The contingency of these relations 
allows us to represent some isolated individuals at the margins of the network. Therefore, in our 
view there is no reason to think that equality would be reached. Naturally enough, each group 
would control different resources to varying degrees, and proportionality would only be guaranteed 
within subgroups, where relations are more tightly-knit and better structured. 
After all, Nash equilibrium is simply a local equilibrium characteristic of monopolies and 
oligopolies, and the hope of harmonising general equilibrium with local equilibria brought about by 
cooperation is impossible, as keenly anticipated by Morgenstern (1972, 1171). The proportionality 
of resources that leads to equality would not occur in the pure communism of Pérez Martí, because 
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 the supplier is willing to favour exchanges with her neighbours at the expense of neglecting the 
preferences revealed in the act of standing in a queue or paying a higher price, regardless of who 
shows these preferences. 
In order to extend proportionality to the rest of society by closing the network, the 
requirement imposed by Pérez Martí would have to be violated to overcome the central planner’s 
problem of imperfect and incomplete information. That is, individuals would no longer be 
conceived as atomic local planners, since they would have ‘to consider the rest of society in their 
decisions.’ But then, this pure communism faces ‘the same problem of the central planner, only 
multiplied by the entire population’, as Pérez Martí indeed fears (2000b, 68). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
First, the pure communism of Pérez Martí can only perform very defective economic calculations, 
being unable to achieve marginal levels of satisfaction. This deficiency occurs when he replaces 
commercial interest with love as the main motivation for conducting trade; the prototypical supplier 
in this model would give up a portion of the benefits normally brought by the sale of her product, in 
return for favouring exchanges with members of her neighbourhood, regardless of their willingness 
to pay a higher price. This would in turn prevent the most urgent preferences of the demanders from 
being met if they are not part of the community of neighbours, and it would therefore be impossible 
to marginally allocate goods to those most in need or who most value them. 
This inefficient allocation of non-primary goods would be avoided if the supplier kept to the 
signals that the market provides to carry out a proper pricing. If this were the case, the supplier 
would trade in response to the preferences revealed in the act of standing in a queue or paying a 
higher price, instead of the bonds of neighbourhood that nurture the relationship between supplier 
and demander. 
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 Second, altruism as a pure mechanism in the model of Pérez Martí could not achieve 
equality without resorting to a central planner, who suffers from the problem of imperfect and 
incomplete information (if the appropriate computer technology is not used). The distribution of 
resources among individuals would be conditioned by their capacity to empathise with others, as 
well as by geographical and cultural barriers. 
Equality only would be achieved within subgroups where relations are more tightly-knit and 
better structured, because wherever bonds of neighbourhood are weaker, suppliers would sacrifice 
profitable exchanges in order to favour their own neighbours. To achieve equality in the whole 
society, the atomic local planners would have to take the rest of the individuals into account in their 
decisions, beyond their community of neighbours, but in doing so each one would become a central 
planner who lacks the information to allocate resources efficiently. 
 
 
Notes
                                                 
1 Entrepreneurial uncertainty has been one of the cornerstones of Austrian economics, whereas neoclassical economics 
has been developed upon the concept of actuarial risk. For a deeper account of the differences between the concepts, 
see Mises (1949, Ch. VI.) and Rothbard (1962, 552-555). 
2 However, the thesis of the impossibility of socialist economic calculation itself was originally expounded 
independently by Brutzkus (1920), Mises (1920) and Weber (1922). They denied that a natural economy could carry 
out any economic activity without the help of an accounting unit, which in market economies is provided by money. 
Countless heterogeneous resources would be beyond the capacity of a human mind to determine the most profitable 
productive combinations in a large natural economy. Similar objections were raised to a labour time accounting 
economy. Nevertheless, as Cockshott and Cottrell (1993) have shown, this impossibility can be overcome in a labour 
time accounting economy by means of modern supercomputers. Although their socialist model continues to suffer from 
the impossibility of dynamic efficiency (See Agafonow 2008). 
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